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APPEAL
I. FORM AND REQUISITES
A. Supreme Court Rules and Procedures
On May 15, 1970, the supreme court adopted an amendment to
RULE 1, RULES OF SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT, which stated:
No case shall be docketed in this Court after the expiration of two
hundred ten (210) days from the date of the service of the notice
of intention to appeal, except by leave of this Court, upon good
cause shown after notice to the respondent.'
Since the adoption of this change, the court has not been generous to
counsel seeking to docket their cases after the expiration of the 210 day
period; indeed, in the majority of attempts by counsel to have the
Rule's provision waived, the court has refused the request.
Bootle v. Labrasca, Inc. 2 was a case whose outcome turned on a
strictly procedural matter. In this personal injury action arising from
the plaintiff's fall in the defendant's restaurant, the defendant urged
that the evidence was insufficient to establish any negligence on its part
as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and, alternatively, the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The supreme
court, in a per curiam decision, held that the defendant's issues were
not before the court because "the record fails to establish that they
were presented to the trial judge by a motion for a directed verdict."
The court further pointed out that "Absent such a motion at the appro-
priate stage of the trial, a motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto
will not lie."
'3
B. Raising Question for First Time on Appeal, Issues Not in Record
The most frequently discussed problem in the area of appeals
concerned the raising of questions on appeal that were not raised at the
trial stage. In McKenzie v. McKenzie,4 a divorce action brought by the
husband on the grounds of physical cruelty, the appellant wife con-
tended that the trial court erred in failing to award her any part of the
property acquired by her and her husband during their twenty five years
1. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 1 (1), as amended (1970).
2. 255 S.C. 134, 177 S.E.2d 544 (1970).
3. Id. at 135-36, 177 S.E.2d at 545.
4. 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970).
1
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of marriage. Since the wife did not raise the issue during the trial, the
supreme court refused to allow the matter to be raised for the first time
on appeal: "It is well settled that an issue which has not been presented
or passed upon by the circuit court will not be considered here."'
Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission' was a
celebrated case dealing with the condemnation of certain lands of the
appellant for use as a parking facility by the state Tricentennial Com-
mission. On appeal to the supreme court, several issues dealing with
appeals were raised. One such question dealt with whether the trial
judge was in error because certain evidence offered to show prejudice
on the part of several witnesses was excluded. "Although evidence
attacking the credibility of an adverse witness is normally admissible,"
the court pointed out that because the testimony of the witness in
question was not included in the record and was not, therefore, before
the court, "It cannot be said that the exclusion of [the] evidence was
reversible error. . .. "
In Gore v. Skipper,8 an action to establish a prescriptive right to
use certain roads on the defendant's lands, a compulsory order of
reference was granted, whereupon the defendant appealed on certain
grounds which, according to the record from the court below, were not
raised or decided upon there. Such issues, the court held, were not
properly before it for review or decision.
Another instance in which the court refused to consider on appeal
facts not appearing in the record as agreed upon and referred to only
in an exception, occurred in Jackson v. Jackson,9 an appeal from a
lower court order which liberalized a mother's visitation rights with her
three minor children. On appeal, the husband contended that the lower
court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce certain testimony. In
upholding the decision of the lower court, the court noted that "the
record nowhere indicates that the husband offered any testimony which
the court refused to admit."' 0
In Buckner v. Preferred Mutual Insurance Co.," the supreme
5. Id. at 375, 175 S.E.2d at 630.
6. 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
7. Id. at 382, 175 S.E.2d at 808.
8. 255 S.C. 18, 176 S.E.2d 569 (1970).
9. 181 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 1971).
10. Id. at 267.
11. 255 S.C. 159, 177 S.E.2d 544 (1970).
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court held, per curiam, that where the appellant insurance company did
not except, at the trial stage, to the second ground for the trial court's
decision, nor did the company argue against such in its brief, then the
finding of the court below, "right or wrong, is the law of this case and
requires affirmance. It would be pointless to consider the exceptions
which do not reach this dispositive finding."' 2
The court issued its most strongly worded statement concerning
those who raise an issue on appeal that was not before the court during
the trial stage in Powers v. City of Aiken.13 In this case, Powers sued
the city for damages sustained in an intersectional collision with an
approaching city police patrol car which had just made a U-turn. The
jury awarded Powers actual damages and the city appealed, question-
ing whether, as required by law,'4 there was any evibence in the record
tending to show actionable negligence on the part of the city in bringing
about the collision.
Powers pointed out that city's contention that there was no evid-
ence of actionable negligence by the city was not raised in the court
below. After a search of the record, the supreme court agreed that the
trial judge was not given an opportunity to rule upon this issue, and
accordingly, the question was not properly before the court. Thereu-
pon, the court issued the following admonition:
This is a court of review, the purpose of an appeal under our
procedure is to determine if the lower court.did something that it
should not have done, or omitted doing something it should have
done. A trial judge will not be reversed for failing to grant a
motion on a ground that was not submitted to him. For the guid-
ance of the bar we restate the holding made by this court in many
cases heretofore: This court will not grant relief on alleged error
asserted for the first time on appeal. 5
C. Standing on Appeal
Cisson v. McWhorter 6 was an action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien upon real property. The lower court directed the requested foreclo-
12. Id. at 160, 177 S.E.2d at 544.
13. 255 S.C. 115, 177 S.E.2d 370 (1970).
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-71 (1962) [repealed by 1968 (55) 3027, effective July 1,
1968] required that negligent acts on the behalf of the city be the sole proximate cause
of injury in order for recovery to be had.
15. Powers v. City of Aiken, 255 S.C. 115, 117, 177 S.E.2d 370, 371 (1970).
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sure and the holder of the first mortgage appealed. In affirming the
decision of the lower court, the supreme court pointed out that the
property was sold subject to the first mortgage lien, and the holder
thereof "was not aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, but
rather benefitted therefrom,"' 7 and therefore had no standing to ap-
peal.
In an appeal from a lower court's denial of the defendant's habeas
corpus petition, the appellant in Schneider v. State'8 challenged the
constitutionality of Section 32-970 of the Code, which provided that a
person charged with a crime and admitted to the State Hospital shall,
at the end of thirty days from his initial confinement, "be returned to
the court if found mentally competent, or if he is found mentally ill,
then the superintendant of the State Hospital shall certify such findings
to the court and shall retain the person as a patient subject to further
orders from the court."
The court pointed out that the defendant had neither alleged nor
sought to prove his sanity, nor had he sought to prove himelf mentally
competent to stand trial for the crimes he was charged with, but had
asked only for his absolute release. The court held that the appellant
had no standing nor was he in any position to challenge the constitu-
tionality of Section 32-970: "A person who does not seek or desire a
judicial or jury hearing as to his sanity is in no position to complain
that the statute does not specifically provide therefor.""8
D. Jurisdiction of the Courts
In the famous case of Mickle v. Blackmon,0 a personal injury
action against the defendant Blackmon and co-defendant Ford Motor
Company, the plaintiff was awarded a judgment against defendant
Blackmon, which was affirmed on appeal. Mickle was awarded a judg-
ment against Ford, which was changed by the trial judge to a judgment
non obstante veredicto on Ford's motion, which judgment was reversed
by the supreme court on appeal and the case remanded.2' A petition
by Blackmon and Ford for a rehearing was denied and the remittitur
was issued on March 5, 1969. On July 21, 1969, the plaintiff moved
17. Id. at 178, 177 S.E.2d at 605.
18. 255 S.C. 594, 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971).
19. Id. at 595, 180 S.E.2d at 341.
20. 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
21. Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
[Vol. 23
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/1
APPEAL SURVEYED
for a partial summary judgment against Ford on the issue of damages.
The motion was refused.
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the supreme court
held that:
on the former appeal, we found that prejudicial error in the in-
structions required a new trial as to Ford and remanded the case
for that purpose. The effect of this mandate was to set aside the
verdict in toto and require a retrial of all issues. If this exceeded
the relief to which Ford was entitled, plaintiff's remedy was by
petition to this court before the remittitur went down. We now
have no jurisdiction of the issues involved in that appeal.2
Parklands, Inc. v. Gibsonz  was an action in which several plain-
tiffs sought to have the conflicting claims of several defendants adjudi-
cated by the court so that funds might be paid out and certain proper-
ties transferred to the defendants. On a prior appeal in the case, 24 the
court held that property situated in South Carolina was the subject of
the action and that jurisdiction upon the appellants-defendants had
been properly acquired by service upon certain ones of them in Texas,
since they claimed an interest in real estate in South Carolina.
The present action was before the court on appeal from an order
of the lower court overruling a demurrer of the defendants to the com-
plaint. Defendants' demurrer, inter alia, contended that the prayer for
relief in the complaint characterized the action as one in personam,
rather than as one in rem, and accordingly, the court could have no
jurisdiction without personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The su-
preme court held this contention to be without merit, "for more than
one reason. . . . [T]he prayer for relief is no part of the cause of action
and this contention might be disposed of on that ground alone, but
additionally, even if there be merit in the contention, such comes too
late, not having been urged when these defendants appeared specially
for the purpose of challenging jurisdiction." Furthermore, the court
pointed out, "Where the court, on a prior appeal has expressly or
impliedly decided that it had jurisdiction at that time, it will not recon-
sider that question on a subsequent appeal. . .. "21
22. Mickle v. Blackmon, 255 S.C. 136, 140, 177 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1970); see
Carpenter v. Lewis, 65 S.C. 400,43 S.E. 881; Exparte Dunovant, 16 S.C. 299 (1881).
23. 255 S.C. 226, 178 S.E.2d 255 (1970).
24. Parklands, Inc. v. Gibson, 253 S.C. 367, 170 S.E.2d 669 (1969).
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In Petroleum Transportation, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission,'2 the court dealt with the problem of whether the Rich-
land County Court of Common Pleas had the proper subject matter
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Public Service Commission. The
plaintiff had been denied a certificate of convenience by the Commis-
sion, whose decision was reversed on appeal by the plaintiff to the
Richland County Court of Common Pleas. The Commission did not
appeal the order of the Common Pleas Court, but, after the time for
appeal had lapsed, moved unsuccessfully to set aside the order because
of an alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court to issue
such an order.
Pointing out that "lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived even by consent and may be raised in this court without an
exception, ' 27 the court reviewed applicable law concerning appeals
from public service commissions 2 and held that while it found no
statutory authority for such an appeal, "The absence. . . of statutory
authorization for an appeal does not preclude judicial review of deci-
sions of the commission in such cases. ' 29 As a result, the court held
that the Richland County Court of Common Pleas did not exceed its
jurisdiction in this case and upheld the decision of that court.
The court delineated the lines of appellate review of administrative
decisions more closely in South Carolina Board of Examiners in Opto-
metry v. Cohen.3" There, the Board of Examiners filed an order sus-
pending Cohen's optician's license for a period of twelve months.
Cohen then petitioned the lower court for a writ of certiorari, which
was granted; whereupon, the lower court reversed the Board and held
that there was insufficient evidence to support its decision. Both Cohen
and the Board appealed.
In dealing with the lower court's review of the order of the Board,
the court pointed out that "The statutory law does not provide for an
26. 255 S.C. 419, 179 S.E.2d 326 (1971).
27. Id. at 424, 179 S.E.2d at 328.
28. In City of Columbia v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 242 S.C. 528, 131
S.E.2d 705 (1963), the court held that there is no appeal from the decisions, orders, or
regulations of public service commissions except as provided for by constitutional or
statutory provisions, and inthe absence of such provisions, no such right exists.
29. Petroleum Transp., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 255 S.C. 419,423, 179 S.E.2d
326, 328 (1971); see also, Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519,93 S.E.2d 873 (1956); Hunter
v. Boyd, 203 S.C. 518, 28 S.E.2d 412 (1943).
30. 180 S.E.2d 650 (S.C. 1971).
[Vol. 23
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/1
APPEAL SURVEYED
appeal from the actions of the board. Traditionally, in this State, the
actions of this board have been reviewed by the courts on a writ of
certiorari." 3
In order o clarify the role which a lower court should play in a
review of the work of an administrative board by way of a writ of
certiorari, the court quoted from Feldman v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,32 which held that
A writ of certiorari cannot be* made a substitute for an ap-
peal. . . .We have held in numerous cases that this court on writ
of certiorari will confine its review to the correction of errors of
law only, and will not review the findings of fact of an inferior
court or body except where such findings are wholly unsupported
by the evidence.3
After a review of the evidence submitted at the Board's hearing
and available to the lower court, the court sustained the appeal of the
Board, authorizing it to carry out its order and stating "We think the
judge in the lower court erred when he concluded that . . .[certain]
testimony was vague. .. .
In A len v. Foss,3 the court pointed out that the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Spartanburg County Court did not extend to appeals from
decisions of the Spartanburg Planning Commission. 6 The court also
refuted the respondent's argument that the appellants had waived all
questions of jurisdiction "by appearing generally and contesting the
appeal on its merits. It is elementary that lack of jurisdiction of the




Vereen v. Bell"8 was an action to rescind and cancel a deed to real
estate on the ground of the alleged mental incapacity of the grantor,
Vereen. The court pointed out that "Although tried below and argued
here, without objection as an action at law, it is clear that the case is
31. Id. at 652; see also, Wagner v. Ezell, 249 S.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 731 (1967).
32. 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
33. Id. at 51, 26 S.E.2d at 24.
34. South Carolina Brd. of Exam. In Optom. v. Cohen, 180 S.E.2d 650, 652 (S.C.
1971).
35. 255 S.C. 336, 178 S.E.2d 659 (1971).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-806 (1962) as amended by an Act of the General Assem-
bly, 1970, (56) 2487, as interpreted through City of Columbia v. South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705 (1963).
37. Allen v. Foss, 255 S.C. 336, 339, 178 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1971).
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one of equitable jurisdiction."39 The court then proceeded to review the
facts of the case as they appeared in the record of the trial court, noting
that "In an appeal in equity cases this court has jurisdiction to find
the facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evid-
ence and may reverse findings of fact by the trial court when the
appellant satisfies this court that such findings are without evidentiary
support or are against the clear preponderance of evidence." 4 After its
review of the evidence as found in the record, the court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding that Vereen "had the mental capac-
ity to know what he was doing. .... 1
Wallace v. Wallace" was an action to require the administrator
of the estate of J. W. Wallace, Sr. to account for certain stocks. The
administrator, as appellant, challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court of Florence for the first time on appeal. When the action was
instituted, the Florence Civil Court's jurisdiction was limited to mat-
ters in which the claim did not exceed $11,000.00.3 The appellant
claimed that the value of the stock in question exceeded the jurisdic-
tional limits of the court; no fraud was charged. The supreme court
pointed out that "The complaint in this action alleged that the value
of the shares of stock in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional
limits of this court. This allegation was admitted in the answer of the
appellant." The court stated further that "Upon service of the com-
plaint, appellant had the right to object to the allegation as to the value
of the stock. Instead of doing so, he admitted that such was true.""
As a result of such inaction by the appellant, the court held that "The
uncontested allegation of the complaint was to the value of the stock
in question determined jurisdiction"4 and held that proper jurisdiction
was had in the Florence Civil Court.
II. THE SUPREME COURT As A COURT OF REVIEW
A. Review of Findings of Fact and Points of Law




42. Op. 19242 (S.C. Jun. 16, 1971).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1608 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1608
(1968).
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v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission" centered around
whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence over the objections
of the appellant. Noting that the admission of evidence is "largely a
matter of discretion"47 of the trial judge, the court stated that
"In order for this court to reverse a case based on the erroneous
exclusion of evidence, the plaintiff must show error and preju-
dice.""8
The court also noted that the testimony in question was not a part of
the transcript of record and, therefore, there could not be found in the
record before the court "a basis for holding that there was such an
abuse of discretion as to warrant a new trial." 9
Jeanes v. Jeanes9 was a proceeding in which the husband sought
to be relieved from the liability of the payment of alimony to the wife
due to her common law remarriage.
Pointing out that divorce, as well as support and maintenance
actions, are proceedings in equity, and, as such, "this court has the
jurisdiction and the power to find the facts in accord with its view of
the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence, at least in the
absence of a jury trial,"5' the court surveyed the evidence and went
beyond the findings of the lower court, holding that "Although the
lower court was reluctant to so find, we are convinced that a common
law marriage of the appellant wife to . . . [X] was established by the
clear preponderance and greater weight of the evidence." 2 The decision
of the lower court was, therefore, affirmed.
Senn v. J. S. Weeks & Co. 3 dealt with an action arising out of an
intersectional collision between two automobiles. The lower court ref-
used to allow to be admitted as evidence certain pictures offered to
show the view that a motorist allegedly would have had of the stop sign
on approaching the intersection.
In reversing the lower court's judgment against the defendant, the
court held the pictures to be "relevant to the one basic and vital issue
46. 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
47. Id. at 405, 175 S.E.2d at 819.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 405-06, 175 S.E.2d at 819.
50. 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970).
51. Id. at 165, 177 S.E.2d at 539.
52. Id.
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in the case. The crucial nature of. . .[such) evidence made its exclu-
sion prejudicial. Its exclusion constituted an abuse of discretion and
warrants the granting of a new trial on that ground." 5
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Wilson 5 was a land
condemnation case in which witnesses for the landowners bringing the
original suit were allowed to testify, over objection, concerning the sale
price of two properties sold nine years prior to the commencement of
the case in question. Holding the admission of the evidence in question
to be a matter "addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,""0
the court then noted that, in this particular instance, "While the sales
referred to were quite remote in point of time, we are not convinced,
under the circumstances here, that there was any abuse of discretion
or prejudice to the Department." 57
Burns v. Caughmanss was an action by the sister of the decedent
against the administratrices of his estate to recover reasonable value of
certain items furnished and services rendered by her to her brother
during his lifetime. A judgment was given to the plaintiff and the
administratrices appealed, contending that testimony allowed by the
lower court to be given by the -plaintiff regarding her rendered services
was inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute.55
However, in view of admissions by the defendants in their answer
that "'certain items were furnished and services performed by plaintiff
for defendant's intestate,' "60 the plaintiff contended that for the court
to allow the testimony in question from her was not prejudicial to the
defendants. With this contention the court agreed.
The court further pointed out that it was not prejudicial error for
the trial judge to allow to be entered into testimony, over the objections
of the defendants, the appraised value of the decedent's estate as a
matter of public record, when later, upon finding out that the plaintiff
sought such testimony as an element to be considered in estimating the
value of the plaintiff's services, the trial judge ruled the same evidence
inadmissible for such purposes.
54. Id. at 338.
55. 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
56. Id. at 369, 175 S.E.2d at 396.
57. Id.
58. 255 S.C. 199, 178 S.E.2d 151 (1970).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962).
60. Burns v. Caughman, 255 S.C. 199, 204, 178 S.E.2d 151, 153 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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Ruth v. Lane"1 was a tort action brought by a common laborer
against his employer to recover for injuries suffered when the laborer
was severely burned while using an acetylene torch. A jury verdict was
given for the laborer, and the employer moved for a judgment non
obstante veredicto, which was denied.
On appeal, the appellant contended that he was entitled to a new
trial because the trial court erred in refusing to charge the following:
The master would have the right to assume that a servant 14 years
of age and upwards was of reasonable capacity for comprehending
and understanding obvious and patent dangers, and if he engaged
in the employment, he did so knowing the risks and therefore
assuming them."
The charge itself was taken verbatim, though out of context, from
a charge which had been approved by the court earlier in the case of
Goodwin v. Columbia Mills Co.63 Commenting on the requested
charge, the court said that "under the facts and circumstances to this
case the requested charge would have been inappropriate in the absence
of considerable modification or revision by the court."'4
The court, therefore, found no prejudicial error in the trial court's
refusal of the requested charge, noting further that the trial court had
submitted the defense of assumption of the risk to the jury by charging
the jury, in language more forceful than that requested, that an em-
ployee is charged with the knowledge of "obvious danger, obvious to
a person of ordinary reason and prudence. . . ."
In Exparte Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,66 the trustees of the estate
of R. P. Byrd, Sr. brought an action to obtain approval of the court
to deviate from the terms of a testimentary trust set up by Byrd in his
will.
The case was referred to the Master in Equity for Florence Coun-
ty, who recommended that the trustees be directed by the court to sell
the portion of the estate in question. Exceptions were taken to the
Master's report. The circuit judge dismissed them and ordered the relief
61. 254 S.C. 431, 175 S.E.2d 820 (1970).
62. Id. at 437, 175 S.E.2d at 823.
63. 80 S.C. 349, 61 S.E. 390 (1908).
64. Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431,438, 175 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1970).
65. Id.
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recommended by the Master. In upholding the decision of the circuit
court, the court pointed out that
We have. . . in an equity case findings of fact by the Master,
concurred in by the circuit judge, and such will not be disturbed
by this court unless found to be without evidentiary support or
against the clear preponderance of evidence. 67
In Campbell v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.," an action to recover
for personal injuries, the defendant appellant moved at appropriate
times for nonsuit and a directed verdict in its favor; and after the
judgment for a judgment non obstante veredicto, or in the alternative,
for a new trial. The court pointed out that the appeal could be disposed
of readily "by determining whether there is any evidence to prove the
allegation"6 of negligence in the complaint. Upon reviewing the evid-
ence as found inthe record of the trial court below, the court reversed
the lower court's decision for the plaintiff.
Sellers v. Public Savings Life Insurance Co.7" was an action by a
widow on a life insurance policy of her husband who accidentally had
drowned. A judgment was given for the widow and the insurer ap-
pealed, contending to be reversible error the exclusion of a witness'
opinion as to whether the decedent was "highly intoxicated" at the
time of the accident which brought about his death, when the defend-
ant's defense to the action was that the insured was either intoxicated
or under the influence of narcotics at the time of his death.
The court agreed with the appellant, stating that "It is well settled
that a lay witness may testify whether or not, in his opinion, a person
was drunk or sober, on a given occasion when observed by that witness,
and that the weight of such testimony is for the jury."7' Thereupon, the
court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case
for a new trial.
Moss v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc." dealt with an action for
damages to the plaintiff's truck which ran into the overturned trailer
67. Id. at 110-I1, 177 S.E.2d at 360. See also Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130
S.E.2d 552 (1963).
68. Op. 19233 (S.C. Jun. 9, 1971).
69. Id.
70. 255 S.C. 251, 178 S.E.2d 241 (1970).
71. Id. at 256-57, 178 S.E.2d at 243. See also State v.Ramey, 221 S.C. 10, 68
S.E.2d 634 (1952); State v. Stockman, 82 S.C. 388, 64 S.E. 595 (1909).
72. 255 S.C. 435, 179 S.E.2d 603 (1971).
[Vol. 23
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of the defendant. The defendant's trailer had been disabled on the
highway near the crest of a hill for some six hours before the daytime
collision, but during the six hours the defendant had failed to display
warnings as required by law.73 A jury verdict gave the plaintiff a judg-
ment for both actual and punitive damages.
On appeal, the defendant-appellant contended that the testimony,
as a matter of law, showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence and contributory recklessness. In affirming the decision of
the lower court, the supreme court held that "The answer of the defend-
ant pled contributory negligence but did not plead contributory reck-
lessness or wilfullness, and the motions at trial conformed strictly to
the answer on this point. Therefore, the claim that the only reasonable
conclusion from the evidence is that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory recklessness raised no issue of determination by us. .. .
The common law doctrine that the release of one of multiple joint
tort-feasors releases all was in issue in Bartholomew v. McCartha.5
There, the plaintiff-respondent was injured in a collision between an
automobile driven by defendant McCartha, and a truck, driven by co-
defendant Shealy. Bartholomew sued both drivers, settling with and
executing a release to co-defendant McCartha. A judgment was held
against Shealy and he appealed.
On appeal, the court held that the common law doctrine that
served as the basis of Shealy's appeal did not apply in South Carolina;
and, further, with regard to Shealy's exception to the lower court's
allowance of the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint by striking
all reference to the co-defendant McCartha, the court pointed out that
"The allowance of the amendment appears to have been in the further-
ance of justice. Certainly no abuse of discretion has been shown."76
B. Review of Lower Court's Use of Discretion in Procedural Matters
Small v. Mungo7 was concerned with the trial court's dismissal,
with prejudice, of appellant's cause of action when neither the appellant
73. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-626 -627 (1962).
74. Moss v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 255 S.C. 435, 437, 179 S.E.2d 603, 605
(1971).
75. 255 S.C. 489, 179 S.E.2d 912 (1971).
76. Id. at 491, 179 S.E.2d at 914.
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nor his attorney appeared when the trial was called. The supreme court
held that the question of whether an action should be dismissed under
Section 10-1502 of the South Carolina Code7" (dismissal for failure to
proceed) was "left to the discretion of the circuit judge and his decision
will not be disturbed except upon a clear showing ofan abuse of such
discretion." 9 The court, however, held that to dismiss the action with
prejudice was not justified and modified the decision of the lower court
accordingly.
Anders v. Nash"' involved two actions, both of which arose out
of an automobild-pedestrian accident. Judgment was given for the
plaintiff in both actions. Nash appealed, charging, inter alia, that the
lower court erred (1) in permitting Mrs. Anders, after the jury was
sworn, to amend her complaint so as to include alleged disfigurement
as an element of damages; and (2) in refusing to strike, as a conclusion
and a non-responsive answer, testimony of Mrs. Anders that she looked
and was cautious as she crossed the street where she was struck by the
defen.. 's car.
The court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court in allowing Mrs. Anders to amend, holding that "The court has
very broad discretion .. . to grant amendments to the pleadings in
furtherance of justice and the exercise of such power will not be dis-
turbed by this court except upon a showing of an abuse of such discre-
tion."si
Furthermore, the court held that Mrs. Anders' statement, that she
had looked and was cautious, "might have been properly stricken as a
conclusion and not responsive to the question asked. However, the
ruling was discretionary and we find no abuse of discretion or resulting
prejudice to defendant's rights from refusal to strike the testimo-
ny. . .
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1502 (1962): "Dismissal for Neglect to Serve a Sum-
mons or Failure to Proceed -The court may dismiss the complaint, with costs in favor
of one or more defendants, in case of unreasonable neglect on the part of the plaintiff to
serve the summons on other defendants or to proceed in the case against the defendant
or defendants served."
79. Small v. Mungo, 254 S.C. 438,441, 175 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1970).
80. 180 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 1971).
81. Id. at 880; S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-692 (1962) gives to the courts broad discre-
tionary powers to grant amendments to the pleadings.
82. Id. at 880-81.
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State v. Greene3 was a prison riot case in which the court, in a
divided opinion held, inter alia, that the conduct of the trial and the
admission or exclusion of evidence had to be left largely to the discre-
tion of the trial judge.
The final appeal issue raised in Timmons v. South Carolina Tri-
centennial Comrnission8l dealt with the fact that the trial judge refused
appellant Timmons' motion for a continuance. In finding no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing appellant's motion,
the court held that "The matter of a continuance is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court; such ruling will not be disturbed unless
manifestly erroneous." '
III. THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Procedural Matters
In Bistrick v. University of South Carolina,6 the plaintiff sought
a three judge federal panel to hear his allegations that the Board of
Trustees of the defendant University had denied certain of his constitu-
tional rights. The District Court held that a district judge, to whom
such application is made, must determine whether a substantial federal
question exists; if such does exist, then the three judge panel must be
convened. Noting that "In deciding whether to request the convening
of a three judge court, the district judge to whom the petition is made
must rest his conclusion on the law as he understands it and the allega-
tions of the complaint,"8' 7 the court thereupon reviewed each cause of
action in the complaint, found no substantial federal question involved,
and denied the request of the plaintiff.
In a per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
McGowen v. Gillenwater,m a personal injury action, held that the dis-
trict judge did not abuse his discretion in barring from the jury the
amount of damages alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. The court
pointed out that such evidence obtained, from the pleadings, was "no
part of the proof and it had no role to play in the jury's consideration
83. 255 S.C. 548, 180 S.E.2d 179 (1971).
84. 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (1970).
85. Id. at 405, 175 S.E.2d at 819.
86. 319 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.C. 1970).
87. Id. at 194.
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of the case. . . . Indeed, the better practice ordinarily is to withhold
all pleadings from the jury." 9
The court then proceeded to dismiss another contention of the
appellant because it was "never properly presented to the district judge,
and it cannot be raised at this time."
90
B. Habeas Corpus Proceedings
In Weathers v. United States,9' the District Court held that the
petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding, a federal prisoner who
previously had filed two motions attacking his conviction and who had
been afforded a full and complete evidentiary hearing on his first peti-
tion, did not have the "endless right to burden the court with repeated
petitions [attacking his conviction]. . . nor can he play 'hide and seek'
by withholding claims, so that he may obtain a second or third review
of his conviction."
92
Blackwell v. United States93 was an appeal from a district court's
denial of habeas corpus relief to the petitioner, a federal prisoner. The
prisoner conte- J that he was entitled to be given credit on his present
sentence for time served under a prior, unrelated, federal sentence
which had been vacated. The court rejected the petitioner's contention
and upheld the district court's decision, citing as its basis for its holding
Davis v. United States Attorney General. 9
JOHN E. CARBAUGH, JR.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 322 F. Supp. 602 (D.S.C. 1970).
92. Id. at 603-04.
93. 438 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1971).
94. 432 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1970).
(Vol. 23
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/1
